This study examines whether differences in financial performance exist for investment trusts which base their portfolio selection primarily on an ethical screen, compared to indexes which incorporate a broader spectrum of investments. Results indicate that on a risk-adjusted basis there is an insignificant difference in the financial performance of these trusts against three common market benchmarks. However as to the extent of the directional effect, there does exist slightly superior financial performance by ethical trusts against their respective industry average indexes, (...) but an underperformance against a smaller company's index and the market as a whole. The lack of a distinct advantage in the short to medium term for applying an ethical screen, may in part be due to the recent development of ethical investments in Australia. Stronger performances by older ethical investment trusts may indicate superior returns are more likely to occur over a longer term. (shrink)

Everyday Utopias explores a topic that is vital but is too often overlooked by utopian scholars. It is best read in tandem with its 2013 predecessor, Weak Messianism: Essays in Everyday Utopianism, by Michael Gardiner. In a nutshell, Cooper, like Gardiner, argues that although utopian visions may be born in the brains of utopian thinkers, progress toward utopia is what counts, and it must be rooted in present patterns and possibilities. Lest my qualms with the book’s execution overwhelm its value (...) for readers, let me emphasize my enthusiastic support of its basic purpose and its promotion of the growing field of practical utopianism, using a strikingly diverse array of cases to stake... (shrink)

Book 1, Part 4, Section 5 of Hume’s Treatise is taken up with a response to an argument for the immateriality of the soul that Hume considered “remarkable,” and that Kant was later to describes as the “Achilles” (the strongest) of all the arguments for this conclusion. This paper surveys versions of the argument offered by Cudworth, Bayle, and Clarke before going on to argue that Hume’s own treatment of the argument departs from the standard in a number of important (...) ways. The departures restate the argument in Humean terms, replacing premises concerning inherence, substance, and action, which Hume considered to be false or unintelligible, with ones mentioning conjunction at a location in space, which he considered to be at least intelligible. These changes challenge the view that Treatise 1.4.5 was intended as a satire or a lampoon. A satire or lampoon exposes a flat statement of its target view to ridicule. It does not modify that view— certainly not by way of introducing improvements to make it more intelligible. Hume meant to endorse what he said in Treatise 1.4.5. In particular, he meant to endorse the tenets that that there are mental states that are spatially extended, and that it is as difficult to explain how an immaterial soul could contain extended mental images as to explain how a material soul could contain unextended thoughts. (shrink)

Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense devotes more space to double vision than to any other topic. In what follows, I examine why this subject was so important to Reid and why he dealt with it as he did. I also consider whether his argument for his position begs the question against his main opponents, Berkeley and Robert Smith. I show that, as Reid presented it, it does, but that he could have said more (...) than he did in reply to Smith. My discussion of why double vision was important for Reid begins with an exposition of the relevance of the theory of vision for one of Reid's principal concerns in the Inquiry: the concern to respond to scepticism concerning our knowledge of an external world. I then turn to consider how Reid's account of double vision contributes to his epistemological realism and why the alternative account offered by Berkeley and Smith challenges it. (shrink)

This paper argues that Kant's first argument in the metaphysical expositions defends a foundational insight on which much of the rest of his thought depends: that our experience of the spatial properties and relations of things is not based on comparison of the things (matters) found in space or on any form of reasoning (causal or demonstrative). Spatial and temporal relations are originally given in sensory intuition, not constructed or inferred.

David Hume’s philosophical work presents the reader with a perplexing mix of constructive accounts of empirically guided belief and destructive sceptical arguments against all belief. This book reconciles this conflict by showing that Hume intended his scepticism to be remedial. It immunizes us against the influence of “unphilosophical” causes of belief, determining us to proportion our beliefs to the evidence. In making this case, this book develops Humean positions on topics Hume did not discuss in detail but that are of (...) interest to contemporary philosophers: consciousness and the unity of consciousness, temporal experience, visual spatial perception, the experience of colour and other qualia, objective experience, and spatially extended minds. It also challenges currently accepted interpretations of Hume’s views on the finite divisibility of space and time, vacuum, the duration of unchanging objects, and identity over time. It deals with criticisms of Hume that were raised by his contemporaries, notably by Thomas Reid, draws attention to earlier seventeenth‑ and eighteenth‑century work that has bearing on the interpretation of Hume’s thought, and compares Hume’s achievements with those of later nineteenth‑century psychologists and philosophers. (shrink)

Kant defined ‘sensation’as ‘the effect of an object on the representative capacity, so far as we are affected by it.’ This is, to put it mildly, not one among his more elegant, clear or helpful sayings. And it is merely an instance of a more general malaise. Kant did not say as much about sensation as he should have, and his account-or lack of it-can be seen at the root of many of the difficulties that have plagued his readers.

Reid declared Hume's appeal to variation in the magnitude of a table with distance to be the best argument that had ever been offered for the ‘ideal hypothesis’ that we experience nothing but our own mental states. Reid's principal objection to this argument fails to apply to minimally visible points. He did establish that we have reason to take our perceptions to be caused by external objects. But his case that we directly perceive external objects is undermined by what Hume (...) had to say about the role played by color in our perception of the primary qualities of bodies. (shrink)

This book presents a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of all of the major arguments and explanations in the "aesthetic" of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The first part of the book aims to provide a clear analysis of the meanings of the terms Kant uses to name faculties and types of representation, the second offers a thorough account of the reasoning behind the "metaphysical" and "transcendental" expositions, and the third investigates the basis for Kant's major conclusions about space, time, appearances, things in (...) themselves, and the cognitive constitution of the subject. A major goal of the work is to establish that Kant takes spatiotemporal form to be originally given through the constitution of the subject's receptive faculty, not generated through synthetic procedures of the imagination or understanding. (shrink)

Hume's scepticism about the ability of demonstrative reasoning to justify many of our most common and important beliefs, such those concerning the connection between causes and effects, does not sit well with his tendency to make normative claims about which beliefs we ought to accept. I argue that Hume's naturalist account of the causes of belief is nonetheless rich enough to provide for normative assessments of belief and even for the modification of beliefs in light of these assessments. I argue, (...) moreover, that far from interfering with his normative claims, Hume's appeals to the force of sceptical arguments are essential premises for this result. (shrink)

It might seem inappropriate to describe Kant as an empiricist. He believed, contrary to the basic empiricist principle, that there are nontrivial propositions that can be known independently of experience. He devoted virtually all of his efforts as a researcher to discovering how it is possible for us to have this "synthetic a priori" knowledge. However, Kant also believed that there are some things that we can know only through sensory experience. Though he did not give these empirical propositions the (...) attention he lavished on their a priori companions, they are both numerous and significant. The purpose of this article is to examine the role of empirical elements in Kant's thought, and to expand on some of the implications that a due appreciation of this empiricism has for the interpretation of his positions on causality, the systematic unity of laws, and realism. In the process a pair of hitherto neglected Kantian notions will come up for close scrutiny: those of affinity and of the exponent of a rule. (shrink)

Drawing on work done by Helmholtz, I argue that Reid was in no position to infer that objects appear as if projected on the inner surface of a sphere, or that they have the geometric properties of such projections even though they do not look concave towards the eye. A careful consideration of the phenomena of visual experience, as further illuminated by the practice of visual artists, should have led him to conclude that the sides of visible appearances either look (...) straight, in which case their angles appear to approximate Euclidean measures, or their angles do not appear to approximate Euclidean measures for straight line figures, in which case their sides do not look straight. (shrink)

The literature on Berkeley is almost unanimous in taking this claim to know the existence of other finite spirits to rest on an argument from analogy. I show that this is not so and that Berkeley uses a causal argument to prove that there are other minds. Questions of the degree to which it is legitimate for Berkeley to appeal to causes, particularly occasional causes, are addressed in the process.

This paper reviews the principal objections that Hume's Scots "common sense" contemporaries had to his account of the understanding. In the absence of any but the most scant evidence of Hume's own reactions to these criticisms, it weighs what he might have said in his own defense.

Hilary Putnam's philosophical views have undergone extensive interpretation over many years. One such interpretive work is George Myerson's book Rhetoric, Reason and Society. Myerson's interest in dialogic rationalism leads him to examine the views of many theorists of rationality, philosophers and non-philosophers alike. As a prominent philosopher of rationality, Putnam is at the very center of this examination. Notwithstanding this fact, I contend that Myerson misinterprets the dialectical character of Putnam's philosophy in general and of Putnam's views on rationality in (...) particular. This misinterpretation, I argue, is revealing of an illusion of thought to which Myerson is subject, an illusion that makes it seem that it is possible to theorize intelligibly about rationality from a metaphysical standpoint. This same illusion, I claim, also makes it seem that Myerson's positive views on rationality are intelligible. Employing a close textual analysis of Myerson's book, I argue that neither scenario is the case. (shrink)

This is the first edition in over a century to present David Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Dissertation on the Passions, Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, and Natural History of Religion in the format he intended: collected together in a single volume. Hume has suffered a fate unusual among great philosophers. His principal philosophical work is no longer published in the form in which he intended it to be read. It has been divided into separate parts, only some of (...) which continue to be published. This volume repairs that neglect by presenting the four pieces that Hume in later life desired to "alone be regarded as containing [his] philosophical sentiments and principles" in the format he preferred, as a single volume with an organization that parallels that of his early Treatise of Human Nature. This edition's introduction comments on the historical origins and evolution of the four parts and draws attention to how they mutually inform and support one another. The text is based on the first (1758) edition of Hume's Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. Notes advise the reader of the changes made in the final (1777) edition. Excerpts from the work of some of Hume's most important contemporary critics are included as appendices. Hume's abundant references to ancient historians, geographers, poets, and philosophers—many of them now quite obscure—are rendered accessible in this volume through extensive textual notes and a bibliography of online sources. (shrink)

The development and use of nanotechnology in the food industry have grown steadily. While visions for nanofood suggest that the applications will improve quality and safety, they are also controversial for several reasons including potential health risks coupled with difficulty in assessing low-dosage nanoparticle risks as well as values-based objections. In recent years, debate over nanofoods has sparked inquiry into factors that predict public attitudes and purchase intentions. Such studies have investigated the roles of demographics and sociographics, value predispositions toward (...) science and technology, preferences for natural products, trust in regulatory agencies, scientific knowledge, and media attention. This study assesses the role of each of these factors in shaping public attitudes toward nanofood and improves the predictive models by evaluating concepts from protection motivation theory. We find that incorporating threat and coping appraisals provides the best predictive models of public attitudes and intention to purchase nanofood products. (shrink)

This book introduces Robert Corrington’s “ecstatic naturalism,” a new perspective in understanding “sacred” nature and naturalism, and explores what can be done with this philosophical thought. This is an excellent resource for scholars of Continental philosophy, philosophy of religion, and American pragmatism.

Reid maintained that the perceptions that we obtain from the senses of smell, taste, hearing, and touch are ‘suggested’ by corresponding sensations. However, he made an exception for the sense of vision. According to Reid, our perceptions of the real figure, position, and magnitude of bodies are suggested by their visible appearances, which are not sensations but objects of perception in their own right. These visible appearances have figure, position, and magnitude, as well as ‘colour,’ and the standard view among (...) Reid scholars has been that Reid maintained that our perceptions of visible figure, position, and magnitude are also not suggested by any sensation. They are instead suggested by the material impression on the retina. Gideon Yaffe challenges the standard interpretation. According to Yaffe, Reid believed that our perceptions of visible figure are suggested by corresponding sensations, by sensations of colour. We defend the standard interpretation of Reid. According to Reid, there is no “local sign” in our sensations of colour. The same colour sensation can be associated with different positions on the visual field, and different colour sensations can be associated to the same position on the visual field. According to Reid, we only have evidence for a correlation between the image on the retina and the perception of visible figure. (shrink)

Kant's problematic conclusion, that we can know that things in themselves are not in space or time, is shown to follow directly from his claim that space and time are manners of disposition or forms of arrangement in which various items are presented to us in intuition. This argument is not strong enough to rule out certain well-defined senses in which things in themselves "could" possibly be spatio-temporal, but it does show that any sense in which things in themselves could (...) be in space or time would bear no relation to the spatio-temporal features of appearances. (shrink)

It is contended that Jurgen Habermas's (1972, 1984) attempts to overcome the problems that positivist thought has caused for theorizing rationality has actually exacerbated positivism's negative effects on conceptualizing rational thought. An overview of Hilary Putnam's (1981) examination of logical positivism's understanding of rationality is presented, emphasizing that positivist approaches toward theorizing rationality are essentially self-refuting in nature since they utilize a metaphysical perspective. Potential objections to the delineation of logical positivism's account of rationality as self-refuting are addressed. Habermas' analysis (...) of positivism's influence on rationality & his concept of communicative competence are then reviewed. Examination of Habermas' attempt to establish a "universal pragmatics" & his contention that validity claims are rationalized through argumentative discourse is performed, leading to the conclusion that such theorizing of rationality is ultimately metaphysical in nature. Treatments of rationality that attempt to impart a comprehensive account of rationality are deemed unintelligible; consequently, it is maintained that all-encompassing delineations of rationality should be avoided in order to produce viable theories of rational thought. (shrink)

This paper contrasts three different positions taken by 18th century British scholars on how sensations, particularly sensations of colour and touch, come to be localized in space: Berkeley’s view that we learn to localize ideas of colour by associating certain purely qualitative features of those ideas with ideas of touch and motion, Hume’s view that visual and tangible impressions are originally disposed in space, and Reid’s view that we are innately disposed to refer appearances of colour to the end of (...) a line passing through the centre of the eye and originating from the spot on the back of the retina where the material impression causing that appearance was received. Reid’s reasons for rejecting the Berkeleian and Humean views are examined. It is argued that Reid’s position on visual localization is ultimately driven by his dualistic metaphysical commitments rather than by an empirically grounded investigation of the phenomena of vision. To this extent, his position sits uncomfortably with his own methodological commitments. (shrink)

Indoleamine 2,3‐dioxygenase (IDO) is the rate‐limiting enzyme in conversion of tryptophan to kynurenines, feeding de novo nicotinamide synthesis. IDO orchestrates materno‐foetal tolerance, increasing human reproductive fitness. IDO mediates immune suppression through depletion of tryptophan required by T lymphocytes and other mechanisms. IDO is expressed by alternatively activated macrophages, suspected to play a key role in tuberculosis (TB) pathogenesis. Unlike its human host, Mycobacterium tuberculosis can synthesize tryptophan, suggesting possible benefit to the host from infection with the microbe. Intriguingly, nicotinamide analogues (...) are used to treat TB. In reviewing this field, it is postulated that flux through the nicotinamide synthesis pathway reflects switching between aerobic glycolysis and oxidative phosphorylation in M. tuberculosis‐infected macrophages. The evolutionary cause of such shifts may be ancient mitochondrial behavior related to reproductive fitness. Evolutionary perspectives on the IDO pathway may elucidate why, after centuries of co‐existence with the Tubercle bacillus, humans still remain susceptible to TB disease. (shrink)

Marina Frasca-Spada's Space and the Self in Hume's Treatise proposes a subjective idealist interpretation of Hume's account of space in part ii of Book I of the Treatise. The book is divided into four chapters. The first deals with Hume's position on infinite divisibility in I ii 1-2, the second with his position on the origin of the idea of space in I ii 3, the third with his account of geometrical knowledge in I ii 4, and the final chapter (...) with his position on vacuum in I ii 5. The subject matter of I ii 6 on the idea of existence is dealt with over the course of the third chapter. Between the second and third chapters, the exposition is interrupted by what Frasca-Spada calls an "Intermezzo." This piece begins by promising to explain why Hume's theory of space is "central to the philosophical substance of the Treatise", but turns to other topics before delivering on the promise. Its relation to the other parts of the book is unclear, and it would have been better included as a preface or appendix, or omitted altogether. (shrink)

Among the distinguished intellectuals of sixteenth-century Italy was Antonio Brucioli, renowned for participating in the gatherings in the garden of the Rucellai in Florence during the second decade of the sixteenth century. Since Delio Cantimori’s fundamental article and Giorgio Spini’s fundamental monograph, Brucioli’s Dialogi have been valued for the insight they afford into the discussions of the Rucellai group. Twice in the Dialogi Brucioli offers a revealing discussion of music. The references reflect intellectual traditions of great significance and longevity and (...) afford valuable insight into the late-Renaissance reception of such venerable doctrines. (shrink)

An overview of Kant's arguments in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" with remarks on some of the most significant recent literature on the topic.

This paper outlines the history of the distinction between a higher and a lower cognitive function up to Kant. It is argued that Kant initially drew the distinction in Scholastic terms--as a distinction between a capacity to image particulars and a capacity to represent universals. However, features of his project in the Critique led him to reformulate the distinction in terms of immediacy and mediacy. Nonetheless, for certain purposes the older, Scholastic distinction retained its attractiveness, and this is the ground (...) for much of the subsequent difficulty with his account of intuitions and concepts. (shrink)

(This article was republished in lightly re-edited form in _Journal of Scottish Philosophy_ 16 (2018) 175-91.) Reid and Berkeley disagreed over whether we directly perceive objects located outside of us in a surrounding space, commonly revealed by both vision and touch. Berkeley considered a successful account of erect vision to be crucial for deciding this dispute, at one point calling it ‘the principal point in the whole optic theory.’ Reid's critique of Berkeley's position on this topic is very brief, and (...) appears to miss Berkeley's point. I argue that there is more to Reid's response to Berkeley than at first meets the eye. Reid's rival account of erect vision draws on evidence that makes a compelling case for the position that we see the same space that we touch. (shrink)

There are good reasons to think that at least a part of Hume's project in the ‘The natural history of religion’ was to buttress a philosophical critique of the reasonableness of religious belief undertaken in other works, and to attack a fundamentalist account of the history of religion and the foundations of morality. But there are also problems with supposing that Hume intended to achieve either of these goals. I argue that two problems in particular – accounting for Hume's neglect (...) of revelation, and accounting for his remarks on the ‘invincibility’ of the reasons for ‘genuine theism’ – can only be resolved by recognizing that Hume's purposes in ‘The natural history’ were not fundamentally critical. If I am right, Hume's purpose was mainly to explain why ‘false’ or ‘adulterate’ forms of religious belief are so widespread and so influential. (shrink)

Hume had two principal arguments for denying that we can have an idea of a vacuum, an argument from the non-entity of unqualified points and an argument from the impossibility of forming abstract ideas of manners of disposition. He also made two serious concessions to the opposed view that we can indeed form ideas of vacua, namely, that bodies that have nothing sensible disposed between them may permit the interposition of other bodies without any apparent motion or occlusion and that (...) it is possible to conceive the contents of a room to be evacuated without being compelled to conceive the walls moving into contact. To reconcile these concessions with his arguments and show why we only “falsely imagine” that we can form the idea of a vacuum, Hume developed a psychological theory of the perception of “invisible and intangible distance” that has something in common with Berkeley’s account of the perception of outward distance. This paper argues that this theory is both untenable and inconsistent with fundamental Humean principles. It explains why Hume should have rejected the two arguments against the idea of a vacuum and why accepting ideas of vacua would have been more in line with the rest of his thought than attempting to deny that we have any such ideas. (shrink)

: I argue that Condillac was committed to four mutually inconsistent propositions: that the mind is unextended, that sensations are modifications of the mind, that colours are sensations, and that colours are extended. I argue that this inconsistency was not just the blunder of a second-rate philosopher, but the consequence of a deep-seated tension in the views of early modern philosophers on the nature of the mind, sensation, and secondary qualities and that more widely studied figures, notably Condillac's contemporaries, Hume (...) and Reid, were not ultimately any more successful at developing an account of vision that unproblematically avoids the paradox. In passing, I take issue with Nicholas Pastore's account of how Condillac's Treatise on Sensations deals with the visual perception of form (in A Selective History of Theories of Visual Perception). (shrink)

This paper examines Berkeley's attitude toward our perception of spatial relations on the two- dimensional visual field. This is a topic on which there has been some controversy. Historians of visual theory have tended to suppose that Berkeley took "all" spatial relations to be derived in the way our knowledge of depth is: from association of more primitive sensations which are themselves in no way spatial. But many philosophers commenting on Berkeley have supposed that he takes our awareness of two- (...) dimensional visual layout to be directly perceived. I argue that Berkeley's position on this issue is deeply ambivalent and that neither alternative sits well with the rest of his philosophy. (shrink)

"Husserl had captured me, I saw everything in terms of the perspectives of his philosophy," wrote Sartre of his conversion to Husserl's phenomenology. In the present volume Cumming analyzes Sartre's transformation of Husserl's phenomenological method into a rudimentary dialectic. Cumming thus provides an introduction to phenomenology itself, and more generally to the ways in which debts to previous philosophies can be refurbished in later philosophies. He shows how phenomenology, which for Husserl was a theory of knowledge in which "we can (...) always presume sincerity," becomes for Sartre a theory in which imagination, self-deception, and role playing are crucial. Cumming also shows that conversion is not merely a personal predisposition of Sartre's—further manifest in his later conversions to Heidegger and to a version of Marxism. Conversion is also philosophical preoccupation, illustrated by the "conversion to the imaginary" whereby Sartre explains how he himself, as well as Genet and Flaubert, became writers. Finally, Cumming details how Husserl's phenomenological method contributed both to the shaping of Sartre's style as a literary writer and to his theory of style. (shrink)